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CASE COMMENTS

selling situation, however, should have been expressly rejected by the
court because, although such application arguably is within the letter
27
of the statute, it is not within the statute's spirit.
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.-Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282
So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).

Paul Brinkley financed a 1968 Buick under a sales contract with
Northside Motors (Northside). The contract stipulated that title and
security remained in the seller until all payments were made in full,
and that the seller retained the right to repossess without notice in
the event of default. After Brinkley had defaulted on the contract,
employees of Northside took possession of the car without his
knowledge or consent. Brinkley brought an action for unlawful conversion and damages. The trial court held invalid the provision of the
sales contract consenting to repossession without notice' and granted
Brinkley summary judgment on the issue of liability. 2 On motion for
rehearing, Northside alleged that the court had failed to consider
the effect of section 679.5033 of the Florida statutes, which grants
27. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967); Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892). Put another way,
the courts ought to look beyond words used in legislation when the supposed meaning
leads to absurd or futile results, or to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392,
400 (1966).
1. Paragraph 18 of the contract provided:
In the event of default . . . Seller, without notice, shall have the right to . . .
(c) lawfully enter the premises of any Buyer where the Motor Vehicle may be
found without prior notice, demand for performance or legal process and take
possession of the Motor Vehicle without being liable in any way to such Buyer on
account of entering said premises . ...
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 1973).
2. See 282 So. 2d at 619.
3. The relevant part of § 679.503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971). This section is a verbatim codification of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-503.
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creditors the right to repossess without judicial process. The trial
court found the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the procedural due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 4 On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court reversed, upholding the constitutionality of section 679.503. 5
After the United States Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.6 and Fuentes v. Shevin7 held two statutory summary

creditors' remedies unconstitutional for failure to require notice and
some form of hearing prior to dispossession, it might have been
expected that similar summary procedures would be challenged. Section 9-503 (self-help repossession) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC)5 is one such summary creditors' remedy that commentators
have suggested might violate the procedural due process requirements
set forth in Sniadach and Fuentes.9 However, the Florida Supreme
Court in Northside Motors refused to extend the rationale of these
cases to invalidate section 679.503, Florida's codification of UCC section 9-503, since no "state action" is involved in repossession undertaken pursuant to that section. 10

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." This prohibition pertains only to deprivations involving action of the state, "by whatever instruments or in
whatever modes that action may be taken." 12 As Justice Bradley ob4. See 282 So. 2d at 619.
5. Id. at 624. The constitutionality of § 679.503 had previously been upheld in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. See McCormick v. First
Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
6. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach struck down Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment procedure as a taking of property without notice and prior hearing in violation of the "fundamental principles of due process." Id. at 342.
7. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the prejudgment replevin procedures of both
Florida and Pennsylvania were held invalid as a violation of due process since no provision was made for an opportunity to be heard prior to dispossession.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. This section, entitled "Secured Party's Right
to Take Possession After Default," is codified verbatim in FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971).
See note 3 supra.
9. See Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession by
Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 HoUSToN L.
REv. 855 (1973). But see Note, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503,
30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547 (1973); Comment, Procedural Due Process: For Sale in
Texas to the Highest Bidder?, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 880 (1973).
10. 282 So. 2d at 624.
11. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880). This was one of the early cases
that emphasized the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment. In
its discussion of state action, the Court further stated that a "State acts by its legislature,
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served in The Civil Rights Cases:13 "It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject-matter of the amendment."' 1 In Sniadach and Fuentes
the issuance of judicial writs' 5 and the acts of sheriffs 6 satisfied the
state action requirement. Since the acts of legal officers of the state
obviously constituted action by the state, the Supreme Court had
7
no difficulty finding the fourteenth amendment applicable.
In determining whether the fourteenth amendment prohibits
creditors' repossession under Florida statutes section 679.503, the
Florida Supreme Court considered the possible existence of "a
sufficient element of state action" evinced by "some form of active
assistance or cooperation on the part of the state" in the challenged
activity.18 On the facts of the case, no direct involvement of any
officer of the state was apparent; Brinkley did not even allege that
the state had acted directly to repossess his car. Thus, the only possible
ground for the finding of "a sufficient element of state action" was
the enactment of section 679.503.
The court implicitly recognized that indirect, nonobvious state involvement in the activities of private parties might, in some cases,
constitute "state action."' 9 However, the court apparently would find
its executive, or its judicial authorities." Undoubtedly, the Court referred to what is
now termed "direct" state action and did not understand this concept to encompass
"nonobvious involvement" of the state.
13. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. Id. at 11. The Florida Supreme Court restated this familiar axiom in its opinion.
See 282 So. 2d at 620.
15. The Wisconsin garnishment statute provided that the clerk of court issue a
summons at the request of the creditor's lawyer. The lawyer then served the garnishee
who "froze" one-half the employee-debtor's wages. The statute gave the plaintiff-creditor
10 days after service on the garnishee in which to serve the summons and complaint on
the defendant-debtor. The debtor was thus deprived of property without any notice
or opportunity to be heard-solely upon the issuance of a summons by the clerk of
court, who was clearly an agent of the state. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. at 338-39.
16. Both the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes involved provided for the issuance
of writs ordering state officers (sheriffs) to replevy the goods and chattels in possession
of the debtors. All that was required to entitle the creditor to the writ was a complaint
alleging that the creditor was lawfully entitled to possession and the posting of a
security bond. Therefore, these cases involved both a judicial writ and its execution
by an officer of the state. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 69-78.
17. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 84-86; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. at 338. In fact, the Court did not expressly address the issue of state action
in either case.
18. 282 So. 2d at 620.
19. The court quoted from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961): " 'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.' " 282
So. 2d at 621 (emphasis added). Burton was an equal protection case wherein a restaurant
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state action only when the state has become "significantly involved"
in the private activities. 20 After noting that the United States Supreme
Court has found sufficient state action in due process cases only where
a state official, agency or branch has taken some direct action, 21 the
located in a publicly owned and operated parking building refused service to plaintiff
solely because he was a Negro. The parking building was financed with public funds
and the restaurant was operated as an integral part of the building even though it was
leased from the state and operated by a private concern. The Court found that these
circumstances constituted "that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."
365 U.S. at 724. The Court labeled the state a "joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private'
as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 365 U.S. at 725. For an
analysis of the case, see Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without
Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1458 (1961).
20. The court noted that in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court refused to find "mere state regulation" sufficient state
action to invoke the fourteenth amendment. The court further noted that Moose Lodge
reaffirmed the premise that where the discrimination in equal protection clause cases
occurs through private acts, "the state must significantly involve itself in the activities
by the private parties in order for those activities to take on constitutional dimen282 So. 2d at 621. Moose Lodge involved a Negro plaintiff who was refused
sions .
service by a local Moose Lodge. Plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the state of
Pennsylvania had issued the lodge a private club license authorizing the sale of alcoholic
beverages on its premises, the refusal of service was state action for the purposes of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court distinguished
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), stating: "In short, while
[the restaurant involved in Burton] was a public restaurant in a public building, Moose
Lodge is a private social club in a private building." 407 U.S. at 175. As to the contention that the state liquor control board's regulation of private clubs constituted "significant
involvement," the Court stated that "[h]owever detailed this type of regulation may be
in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination . . . . We therefore hold that, [with a noted exception], the operation of the
regulatory scheme enforced by the [liquor control board] does not sufficiently implicate
the State in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge so as to make the latter
'state action' within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 407 U.S. at 176-77.
21. 282 So. 2d at 621. The court quoted with approval from the decision of Greene
v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972), which also involved the
constitutionality of UCC § 9-503. See 282 So. 2d at 621. Greene held that the fourteenth
amendment was not applicable because "the operation of the statute involved does not
require the aid, assistance, or interaction of any state agent, body, organization, or
function." 348 F. Supp. at 675. The Florida Supreme Court was apparently in full agreement with the statement quoted from Greene: " 'The cases appear clear in this area that
under the Fourteenth Amendment due process is denied only when an arm of the
state acts directly against an individual's property and deprives him of it without
notice or a hearing.' " 282 So. 2d at 621, quoting from 348 F. Supp. at 674. Following this
statement, Greene lists several United States Supreme Court decisions finding violations
of due process, all of which involved some direct action by the state. This prompted
the court to state its opinion that "passive state action such as is present in [this case]
is not violative of due process. There must be active and direct state action." 348 F.
Supp. at 675.
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion followed closely the reasoning and language
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court labelled section 679.503 an "insignificant" factor in determining
whether state action inhered in self-help repossession.12 This conclusion
was premised on the fact that the right to repossess had existed in
Florida in "contract, pre-commercial code law." 2 The court then
held that "self-help repossession by a creditor does not constitute state
action,"' 24 adding that section 679.503 does nothing more than codify
or restate "a common law right and a contract right," and that it
"creates no new rights," but "merely recognizes the parties [sic] right
to contract in such a manner if they so desire."2 5
In concluding that the enactment of section 679.503 was too insignificant to constitute state involvement in self-help repossession, the
court failed to consider two approaches previously used to find state
action in the indirect acts of states. First, the court totally ignored the
"state function" concept, 2 which the United States Supreme Court
has employed to invoke the fourteenth amendment. Nixon v. Condon27
illustrates this approach. There, the executive committee of the Texas
Democratic Party, empowered by the Texas legislature to regulate
primary elections, restricted its membership to whites after a statutory
whites-only voting restriction had been declared unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court held that the committee members were operating
as "delegates of the State ' ' 28 and, therefore, committee actions constiof Greene. Both opinions seem to draw a distinction between due process and equal
protection clause cases. Greene does this by referring strictly to due process cases,
while in Northside Motors, the court, through its brief discussion of Burton and Moose
Lodge, merely acknowledges that "nonobvious involvement" has been sufficient state
action in equal protection clause cases and then turns to Greene and its discussion of the
due process clause cases which involved some direct action by the state. The distinction
the court is making is apparent: nonobvious, passive state involvement has not been
sufficient to constitute state action in due process clause cases. This may be true of
United States Supreme Court decisions. See the collection of cases in Greene v. First
Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 674 (W.D. Va. 1972), reproduced in Northside
Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 621 (Fla. 1973). However, the lower federal
courts have found sufficient state action in due process clause cases involving nonobvious,
indirect state action. See, e.g., Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452
F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1971);
Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1125 (2d Cir. 1970).
22. 282 So. 2d at 622.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The fourteenth amendment has been applied to actions involving private
individuals or organizations which are performing what is, or should be considered,
a state function. For an excellent analysis of this aspect of the state function doctrine,
see Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay
on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1050-74 (1973).
27. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
28. "Whatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the
committee has come to them, therefore, not as the delegates of the party, but as
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tuted state action violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.2 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit employed a similar approach in Hall v. Garson.30 An
agent of a landlord, with neither consent from the tenant nor authorization by any judicial or administrative officer, entered the tenant's
apartment and seized a television set as security for overdue rent payments. The Fifth Circuit, relying upon Fuentes, held unconstitutional
the Texas statute granting the right to enforce a landlord's lien by
peremptory seizure and retention of property.3 1 In an earlier appeal
of the same case, 32 the Fifth Circuit had reasoned:

In this case the alleged wrongful conduct was admittedly perpetrated by a person who was not an officer of the state or an
official of any state agency. But the action taken, the entry into
another's home and the seizure of another's property, was an act
that possesses many, if not all, of the characteristics of an act of the
State. The execution of a lien, whether a traditional security interest
or a quasi writ of attachment or judgment lien has in Texas traditionally been the function of the Sheriff or constable. Thus [the statute
in issue] vests in the landlord and his agents authority that is
normally exercised by the state and historically has been a state
function.

33

The court must first conclude that a particular function is one that
properly belongs to the state before finding state involvement in the
actions of private individuals or organizations. This consideration
should mitigate any fear of subjecting all contracts-and, ultimately,
3
the entire credit structure-to fourteenth amendment requirements. 4
the delegates of the State." Id. at 85. Further, "[t]he pith of the matter is simply this,
that when those agencies are invested with an authority independent of the will of the
association in whose name they undertake to speak, they become to that extent the
organs of the State itself, the repositories of official power." Id. at 88.
29. Id. at 89.
30. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 848.
32. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). Fuentes was decided subsequent to
this appeal of Hall and prior to the 1972 appeal.
33. 430 F.2d at 439 (footnote omitted). On second appeal, the court stated that the
statute in issue "cloth[ed] the apartment operator with clear statutory authority to enter
into another's home and seize property contained therein. This makes his actions those
of the State." 468 F.2d at 848.
34. The court in Northside Motors quoted from Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank,
12 UCC REP. S.Rv. 739 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1973), for the proposition that an extension of
Fuentes to this situation would have an adverse effect on the entire credit structure of
the United States. Id. at 741, quoted in 282 So. 2d at 623. Surely the presently existing
legal restrictions on self-help repossession restrict its use to such an extent that it can
have very little significance for the entire credit structure of the United States. See
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The very existence of judicial remedies such as replevin, landlords'
liens and ejectment, however, supports the notion that dispossession
generally requires state participation and distinguishes acts of dispossession from other purely commercial actions. The Florida Supreme
Court might have used the state function principle to conclude that
a private individual acting under authority of Florida statutes section
679.503 is, in effect, performing a state function and, therefore, that
his actions constitute state action.
The "encouragement" theory is a second approach to the state
action issue that the Florida Supreme Court might have considered.
The United States Supreme Court has found significant state involvement in private acts when the state has in some manner "encouraged" those acts.3 5 Reitman v. Mulkey,6 cited by the Northside
Motors dissent, 7 suggests this approach. There, the Supreme Court
found a newly enacted amendment to the California constitution
violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. The
new amendment effectively precluded future fair housing legislation
by raising to constitutional status a citizen's right to decline to sell
his real property to anyone he might choose.38 The Court noted that
the effect of the amendment was to "encourage" discrimination in
the private housing market,35 and to frustrate attempts by minority
40
groups to instigate fair housing legislation.
Burke & Reber, supra note 26; Krahmer, Slifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due
Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 23
(1972); Note, Automobile Repossession: Law in Flux, 2 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV.
43 (1972). But see Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972);
Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82
(1973).
35. It has been asserted that the United States Supreme Court has never found
state action on the basis of the "authorization" and "encouragement" theory. Burke &
Reber, supra note 26, at 1098-99. The authors contend that although the Court has
spoken of encouragement and authorization in its opinions, the references have not
been material because of the presence of other factors and because of the Court's
tendency to cumulate these factors in reaching its decision. However, even if this
view is adopted, the state function approach presents an additional factor that could
have been considered in the principal case.
36. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
37. 282 So. 2d at 625.
38. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26 read:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell,
lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
39. 387 U.S. at 375, 381.
40. Although the Supreme Court did not expressly state this conclusion, it may be
fairly implied from the opinion: "The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

Justice Ervin's dissent in Northside Motors noted with approval
41
the "encouragement" theory suggested by Reitman. ' Ervin stated
that "[t]he enactment of [UCC section 9-503] into law means that
Florida has chosen to explicitly sanction and support extrajudicial
summary repossessions." 42 In Adams v. Egley"3 a federal district court
found that the enactment of UCC section 9-503 into law constituted
"sufficient state action to raise a federal question," relying almost ex44
clusively upon Reitman. Although the Ninth Circuit reversed Adams,
and while the reasoning of the Adams district court has been more widely rejected than accepted, ' 5 most courts, in passing on the state action
issue, have at least considered the effect of encouragement through
state authorization. The majority in Northside Motors failed even
to address this question.
The Florida Supreme Court also might have found state action in
the enactment of section 679.503 because of that legislation's ultimate
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government."
387 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
It has been suggested that the "encouragement" concept actually had minimal influence in Reitman, and that the apparent discriminatory intent of the amendment
prompted the Court's decision. See Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69,
75-82 (1967); Burke & Reber, supra note 26, at 1074-82.
41. 282 So. 2d at 625-26.
42. Id. at 625. This observation fairly distinguishes the self-help repossession statute
from the state liquor license regulation that was found not to implicate the state in
the discriminatory practices of the licensee in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972). The challenged practice in Moose Lodge was merely incidental to the
holding of a license and was not dictated by the state liquor control board's regulations.
Section 679.503, on the other hand, specifies exactly the procedure challenged. The
United States District Court for Vermont noted the significance of a similar distinction
in Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERv. 543, 548 (D. Vt. 1972):
[W]here the legislature has undertaken to prescribe the method and means for
divesting property rights, the courts can direct that the safeguards of due process
are met [sic], and that the buyer's property will not be summarily forfeited prior
to an adequate and effective judicial determination of the rights of the parties.
43. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
44. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 42 U.S.L.W. 2230 (9th Cir., Oct. 4,
1973). In its analysis of the state action question the court stated:
The objective finding that the creditors in part acted with knowledge of and
pursuant to state law is but one element of the action taken under color of state
law requirement; alone it is not sufficient. The test is not state involvement, but
rather is significant state involvement. Statutes and laws regulate many forms of
purely private activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting all
behavior that conforms to state law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept.
Id.
45. For a listing of the cases involving the constitutionality of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-503, see Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 8 nA90 (1973).
The authors list 36 cases, 32 of which upheld the section's constitutionality.
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impact upon Florida contract law. Contrary to the court's conclusion
that section 679.503 merely codified a pre-existing common law
right, 4 6 the adoption of that provision has significantly altered prior
law. The court apparently assumed that, before the enactment of
section 679.503, a seller in Florida was presumed to enjoy the right
to repossess regardless of whether summary procedure was authorized
by the contract. 47 However, Florida law had presumed exactly the
opposite-that a seller did not have the right to self-help repossession
unless specifically provided for in the contract.48 Since the enactment
of section 679.503 extends to the seller the right to self-help repossession "unless otherwise agreed ' ' 49 the statute has reversed the prior pre46. 282 So. 2d at 622.
47. The court relied in part upon Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1972), a decision upholding New Jersey's adopted version of UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. There the court, with citations to the same treatises referred
to in Northside Motors, concluded that since "self-help has been known to the common
law for centuries," codification of this practice cannot give it the color of state law
so as to "take it out of the private area and make it subject to the Fourteenth Amendment." 295 A.2d at 405-06. The court then quoted from the amicus curiae brief filed
in the appeal of Adams to the Ninth Circuit by Professor Mentschikoff on behalf of
the permanent editorial board for the UCC:
" 'Section 9-503 simply recognizes this common knowledge of buyers on time that
repossession follows default and makes unnecessary its statement in the contract.
It cannot be that codifying a generally understood practice of ancient and honorable
lineage and surrounding it with safeguards renders the practice unconstitutional.' "
295 A.2d at 406, quoted in Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 623 (Fla.
1973).
48. In fact, this opposite presumption was at one time recognized by statute in
Florida:
When the buyer is in default in the payment of any sum due under the contract
or in the performance of any other condition or promise, the breach of which is
by the contract expressly made a ground for the retaking of the motor vehicle,
the holder may retake possession thereof either peaceably or by legal process.
Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-117, § 2 (repealed 1965). See C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 200 So. 910
(Fla. 1941); C.I.T. Corp. v. Reeves, 150 So. 638 (Fla. 1933); Percifield v. State, Ill So. 519
(Fla. 1927). The Florida Supreme Court quoted from Percifield to illustrate that "contract, pre-commercial code law clearly gave the seller the right to repossess upon
default of the buyer." 282 So. 2d at 622. However, the language quoted by the court
serves to illustrate the opposite conclusion:
"[W]hen default has occurred .. . the vendor has the legal right to take possession
of the property, sell the same and apply the proceeds to the payment of the
obligation, and, if the note or contract contains the provision that the vendor
under such conditions may repossess the property without process of law, then
the vendor may repossess such property without resorting to legal process, if he
can do so without committing a breach of the peace or committing an unlawful
trespass."
Id., quoting from 111 So. at 520 (emphasis added). Percifield has been cited for the
proposition that "[u]nder an express provision of the contract" the creditor has the
right to repossess peacefully. Annot., 55 A.L.R. 180, 184 (1928).
49. See note 3 supra.
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sumption. Thus, the state has acted affirmatively to strengthen the bargaining position of the seller.
In reaching its conclusion, the court stressed that self-help repossession under section 679.503 can only be carried out "peacefully
without a breach of the peace and thus an aggrieved debtor has access
' ' 5 1 Use of self-help
to the courts if self-help is used improperly.
techniques that would result in a breach of the peace "would expose
the creditor to tort liability and would also expose him to liability
under Florida Statute 679.507 ...."52 Apart from the statutory liability, the court apparently was referring merely to those acts of repossessors for which damages traditionally have been recoverable in
57
tort: 53 trespass; 54 assault; 55 conversion;"' and negligence. However,
the court did suggest that a tort action also might lie for repossession
over a debtor's physical objection when a chattel is located on a public
street.5 1 Since the repossessor cannot remove a chattel from inside a
50. If the supreme court had found state action in the legislature's codification
of self-help repossession, Northside could have argued that, since it had repossessed
Brinkley's automobile pursuant to a private agreement, its actions should remain
free from the strictures of fourteenth amendment due process. Indeed, several courts
have suggested that if parties provide for a certain practice in a private contract, their
acts pursuant to that contract remain private regardless of its conformity with statutory
requirements or codification of the practice. See, e.g., Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972).
51. 282 So. 2d at 624.
52. Id.
53. The court's loose phraseology might suggest that it intended to create a new
"breach of the peace" tort action. But breach of the peace traditionally has been viewed
as a crime against society to be suppressed by criminal sanctions-not as an interpersonal
offense to be remedied by a private, civil action. Thus, the phrase "if this can be
done without breach of the peace," FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1971), seems intended merely
to emphasize that the repossessor may not violate any criminal laws in his attempt
to repossess.
54. See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 200 So. 910 (Fla. 1941). There the automobile
had been repaired by plaintiff's garage, but the owner failed to pay for the repairs.
Consequently, the plaintiff refused to allow the owner to take possession. The bank
that had financed the automobile assigned the conditional sales contract to the defendant.
When defendant's agent attempted to repossess the vehicle after plaintiff refused to give
up possession, a fight ensued and plaintiff received a "serious hernia resulting in great
pain and suffering and in permanent injury." Id. at 911. Plaintiff was allowed to recover
on both trespass and assault theories.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Southern Indus. Say. Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d Mist. Ct.
App. 1969), cert. denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969) (action for conversion of personal
articles in car trunk at time of repossession).
57. Id. The court classified the repossessor as a constructive bailee of the personal
property left in the trunk of the car and found a breach of the bailee's duty of care.
58. 282 So. 2d at 624-25. In some, if not all, such situations it would seem that
an action for assault would lie.
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house or garage without permission from the debtor, it appears that
only those repossessions that occur on the street or in the debtor's
driveway, and that avoid any confrontation with the debtor, are re59
latively safe from legal sanctions.
Additionally, a finding that a breach of the peace has occurred
will expose the creditor-repossessor to liability under section 679.507
of the Florida statutes. 60 This section provides two possible remedies
for the debtor. First, if the creditor has not disposed of the collateral,
the debtor may petition the court to restrain disposition on appropriate
terms. 61 Second, where disposition has occurred, the debtor has the
right to recover from the creditor any loss caused by the creditor's
acts, with a minimum recovery set by the statute.62 The recovery
under the statute for "any loss" caused by the creditor may, in some
cases, overlap the debtor's common law tort remedy. If so, it is doubtful that the courts would allow double recovery and therefore the
63
debtor would have to elect his remedy.
Regardless of the remedies available for breach of the peace, the
very existence of section 679.503 will inevitably lead to confrontations
that might degenerate into physical altercations. Obviously, an in59. Repossession from the debtor's driveway, where he has not given consent in the
security agreement, probably would be a technical common law trespass, entitling the
debtor to at least nominal damages. See Leonard v. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 122
So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960). However, the court acknowledged that the
repossessor probably would not incur any significant liability in this situation. 282
So. 2d at 624-25.
60. FLA. STAT. § 679.507, entitled "Secured party's liability for failure to comply
with this part," provides in part:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of this part disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate
terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor . . . has a right
to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with
the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods the debtor has
a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.
FLA. STAT. § 679.507(1) (1971).
61. FLA. STAT. § 679.507 (1971). Since § 679.503 stipulates that the creditor cannot
repossess without judicial process unless this can be done without breach of the peace,
a creditor who does breach the peace has not proceeded in accordance "with the
provisions of this part." The "part" referred to is part V of ch. 679, entitled "Default,"
and consists of §§ 679.501-.507.
62. See note 60 supra. Since an automobile is likely to be considered a "consumer
good," the debtor could qualify for the minimum damages. See FLA. STAT. § 679.109 (1971).
63. Suppose, for example, that the creditor repossesses without cause and disposes
of the vehicle. The debtor could bring an action for conversion or proceed under the
statute. Assuming that the debt outstanding was approximately equal to the fair
market value of the car, the debtor would be best advised to proceed under the statute
and take the minimum recovery.
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dividual might react violently to the sight of an ununiformed stranger
entering his automobile or attempting to drive it away. The court's
approval of summary repossession, even if only applicable to automobiles, will undoubtedly lead to regrettable consequences.6 4 The

fact that punitive65 as well as actual damages are recoverable from
repossessors is an unpersuasive defense of this procedure.
While the result reached in Northside Motors comports with the
view of most courts that have heard challenges to the constitutionality
of UCC section 9-503, 61 both the judiciary and the legislature should
review more carefully the wisdom of contractual and statutory selfhelp repossession. Even though analysis may find insufficient state
action to invoke the fourteenth amendment, fair and orderly procedure
would seem to be a desirable policy to apply to private takings of
property, as well as to those in which the state is involved. Regardless
of whether one adopts the view that the fourteenth amendment applies
to private repossession, something analogous to procedural due process
should apply. This is not to suggest that a full, pre-repossession hearing
in an adversary setting should be required. Rather, the task remains
that set forth in Fuentes-"to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing ... "67 Although this may be a proper task for
the legislature, the judiciary should not hesitate to explore the alternatives 68 to self-help repossession and to delineate the legal requirements that must be satisfied before the courts will sanction the
taking of property without a judicial determination of the right to
possession.
64. See note 54 supra.
65. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Buie v. Barnett First Nat'l Bank, 266 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1972).
66. See note 45 supra.
67. 407 U.S. at 97 n.33.
68. For suggested alternatives to self-help repossession, see Note, Automobile Repossession: Law in Flux, 2 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 43 (1973). See generally
Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique tols
Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116 (1973).

